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THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER
By WimLiAmz A. CLni~tJRG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The legislative article of the Constitution delegates to the
President a limited power of veto.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
prove he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and
proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all
such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by
Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and
against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like
Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not
be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be neces-
sary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be pre-
sented to the President of the United States; and before the
Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives according, to the Rules
and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.'
No legislation ever has been enacted giving practical effect to
and insuring the fulfillment of these provisions, and they have
been construed only fragmentarily by the judiciary.
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B.,
Nebraska State College; LL.B., Nebraska University.
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
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It is not here intended to analyze all the many aspects of the
President's veto power nor to probe all the many areas of doubt
that are engendered by a phrase-by-phrase dissection of article
I, section 7. Rather, it is the limited ambition of this article to
point up the very real necessity for the enactment of legislation
that will define the operative terms of these veto provisions and
prescribe a procedure to be followed by the President and the
Congress in the exercise of their respective functions under those
provisions.
These two paragraphs of the Constitution represent the effort
of the framers to distill from history a veto power best suited
to a government structure composed of three separate but co-
ordinate instrumentalities of delegated powers. Fully to under-
stand the intended scope and heft of this veto power requires,
therefore, some understanding of the evolution of the executive
veto, for it was from this evolutionary history that the framers
extracted those features which distinguish the presidential veto
power.
The executive veto is not an American invention; the concept
dates back to the beginnings of organized government. The scope
of the veto power has ranged in history from the absolute power
to nullify both legislative and executive acts to the more moder-
ate power to delay, if not nullify, only legislative acts. In es-
sence, the veto is and always has been a governmental device
employed either to protect the people governed or to protect the
office of the person empowered to employ it, or both.
In ancient Rome, the Tribune most effectively performed the
function of his office, which was the protect the plebs from
injustice at the hands of the patricians, by uttering the word
"Veto," meaning "I forbid."'2 This tribunician veto, binding upon
even consuls and praetors, was strictly negative in effect and has
been described as an anarchial act which could bring the whole
of the state machinery to a standstill.3
In England, too, the veto power had its genesis early in the
history of English government. Long before the Battle of Hast-
ings, as the early English Kings expanded their realms over the
island, the assemblies, which were made up of all the freemen of
the kingdom, became impracticable and were replaced by a na-
tional assembly composed principally of persons chosen by the
2. See BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 1 (1925); HUN-
TER, ROMAN LAW 14, 1045 (3d ed. 1897).
3. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCrON TO ROMAN LAW 14 (1939).
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king. The voice of the freemen was thus stifled.4 During the
reign of Edward III, the Parliament usurped the power to enact
legislation, but even then the King, in approving legislative acts,
would occasionally modify the petitions upon which they were
based." In the reign of Henry V, the House of Commons asserted
the right to act upon such amendments, but the King's approval,
nevertheless, was necessary for an act to become effective.0 This
prerogative is said to be the progenitor of the presidential veto
power, but it was absolute, being unencumbered by any possi-
bility of being overridden by the Parliament.
Eventually, the king's only direct connection with the legis-
lative process was limited to his acceptance or rejection of a bill
as passed by both houses of Parliament.7 Because of the final
and absolute nature of the king's veto power, no monarch has
exercised that power for more than 250 years.8 Although this
veto power continues to repose in the English monarch, its exer-
cise would constitute such a flagrant breach of tradition that it
has been said he would not veto even a bill calling for his own
execution.0
'While the king, after 1707, denied himself the exercise of the
veto power with respect to domestic legislation, he frequently
asserted his absolute power of veto over colonial acts.10 His
power extended even to colonial acts approved by the colonial
governor," and in all of the American colonies, save three, the
governors had the veto power.'
2
Thus, the veto power was familiar to and understood by the
American colonists, and they were so greatly disturbed by what
they considered George III's abuse of the power that the Declara-
tion of Independence named that abuse as a reason for their dis-
affection. "He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most whole-
some and necessary for the common good." 1
4. FREEISAN, THE GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 38, 53 (3d ed.
1898).
5. HEARN, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 57 (1867).
6. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 257 (1942).
7. Id. at 385.
8. HEA N, op. cit. supra note 5, at 60-61; 2 CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE CON-
STITuTIoN 266 (1858).
9. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 122 (2d ed. 1873).
10. 4 ELLIOTT, DEBATES 620 (1836).
11. DicEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 112 (7th ed. 1908).
12. See PooRE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS (1877),
for charters. The exceptions were Maryland, Rhode Island and Connecticut.
13. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
[Vol. 18
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The independent colonies, in composing the Articles of Con-
federation, evinced their total distrust of an executive branch of
government by creating none. In fact, the colonists distrusted
all aspects of a central government, and gave to the Congress of
the Federation only very limited powers. The American expe-
rience under the Articles had served to establish, however, the
vital need for a chief executive, and at the Constitutional Con-
vention the delegates came to agree that the chief executive
should have a power of veto.
If there were brought together all the treatises that have been
written about the birth, and the purpose and meaning of the
Constitution, a sizeable edifice would be required to house
the collection. The volumes in such a library -would include many
pages expository of article I, section 7, but nothing ever written
about the concept that is given expression in those provisions has
added to or in any way discredited what Alexander Hamilton
said about it in The Federalist.1" The following excerpts from
his paper No. 73 have illuminating pertinence here:
The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the
qualified negative of the President upon the acts or resolu-
tions of the two Houses of the Legislature; or in other words
his power of returning all bills with objections; to have the
effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should
afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the com-
ponent members of the legislative body.
The propensity of the legislative department to intrude
upon the rights and to absorb the powers of the other de-
partments, has been already suggested and repeated; the
insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the bound-
aries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity
of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own
defence, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and
indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative,
either absolute or qualified, in the executive, upon the acts
of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other the
former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against
the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be strip-
ped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated
by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legis-
lative and executive powers might speedily come to be
14. THE FEDERAiST Nos. 51, 69, 73 (Hamilton).
1966]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss5/2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever
discovered itself in the legislative body, to invade the rights
of the executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic
propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought
not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to possess
a constitutional and effectual power of self defence.
But the power in question has a further use. It not only
serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an addi-
tional security against the enaction of improper laws. It
establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body cal-
culated to guard the community against the effects of faction,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public
good, which may happen to influence a majority of that
body.
0 : * The primary inducement to conferring the power in
question upon the executive is, to enable him to defend him-
self; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor
of the community, against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is
brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be
the danger of those errors which flow from want of due
deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the
contagion of some common passion or interest.
* 0 : But the Convention have pursued a mean in this busi-
ness; which will both facilitate the exercise of the power
vested in this respect in the executive magistrate, and make
its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of
the legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is
proposed to give the executive the qualified negative already
described. This is a power, which would be much more
readily exercised than the other. A man who might be
afraid to defeat a law by his single veto, might not scruple
to return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally
rejected only in the event of more than one third of each
house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He
would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition
should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable pro-
portion of the legislative body, whose influence would be
united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct,
in the public opinion. A direct and categorical negative has
something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more
[Vol. 18
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apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative
objections to be approved or disapproved, by those to whom
they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to
offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and for this
very reason it may in practice be found more effectual. It
is to be hoped that it will not often happen, that improper
views will govern so large a proportion as two-thirds of both
branches of the Legislature at the same time; and this too in
defiance of the counterposing weight of the executive. It
is at any rate far less probable, that this should be the case,
than that such views should taint the resolutions and con-
duct of a bare majority. A power of this nature, in the execu-
tive, will often have a silent and unperceived though for-
cible operation. When men engaged in unjustifiable pur-
suits are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter
which they cannot control, they will often be restrained, by
the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they
would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impedi-
ments were to be feared.
15
Hamilton's observations, faithfully reflecting the thinking
and aims of the majority of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, identify clearly those features of the historic veto
which the delegates selected for incorporation into the President's
veto power. It is patent from Hamilton's reports that the power
given the President by the Constitution to approve or disap-
prove legislation (his disapproval being qualified by the Con-
gressional power to override it) was conceived to serve as a de-
vice for maintaining, once the new government was activated
and in operation, the same nice balance of powers which the
framers had achieved in their "parchment delineation." The
power of veto was made available for use by the President to
protect the executive branch against the natural "propensity
of the legislative" to encroach upon it, and was made available
for his use against legislation that would serve provincial in-
terests at the expense of the national interest and against any
other legislation considered by him to be improvident.
The importance of the presidential veto power, as a function-
ing component of the system of checks and balances, is impos-
sible to exaggerate. Woodrow Wilson declared it beyond all
comparison the President's most formidable prerogative. 16 Bryce
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 71 (2 Dunn ed. 1901) (Hamilton).
16. WILsoNr, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 52 (15th ed. 1925).
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noted that while the strength of the Congress consists in its
power to pass statutes, the strength of the President consists in
his right to veto them; he regarded it as a device admirably
adapted to thwart tyranny.17
A distinguishing feature of the President's power to approve
or disapprove legislation passed by the Congress, and a feature
having important implications, is that it represents a departure
from the concept of separated powers and, in the final analysis,
is a legislative power, for in approving or disapproving legis-
lation the President is functioning as an integral part of the legis-
lative process. The fact the veto provisions are contained in
article I of the Constitution is conclusive that the power was so
regarded by the framers. Wilson, in identifying the veto power
as the President's most formidable prerogative, observed that
the President is thus powerful rather as an arm of the legislative
than as the head of the executive branch.' 8 The Supreme Court
also has observed that "undoubtedly the President when approv-
ing Bills may be said to participate in the enactment of laws,
which the Constitution requires him to execute."' 9
The practical and philosophical purposes intended to be served
by the presidential power of veto fail to be served if frustration
and circumvention of the power are made possible by uncertain-
ties as to the precise meaning of various words and phrases in
article I, section 7. Such uncertainties do exist, as will be shown,
and they become apparent when the language of the veto pro-
visions is sought to be applied to factual situations that can and
do arise in the legislative enactment process. It is imperative
that these ambiguities be eliminated to the end that the presi-
dential veto power may do the job it was designed and intended
to do.
II. Tmn PRoPInETY oF LEGISLATIv.E IifPL=NTATION
It is not surprising that uncertainties in the meaning of key
words and phrases in the Constitution's veto provisions become
evident when those provisions are sought to be applied to precise
situations, although it is more than surprising that these uncer-
tainties have been so long tolerated. Article I, section 7, does not
embody the specifics for resolving all the problems that its appli-
cation can generate, as the authors of the Constitution did not
17. 1 BRYcE, THE Ammanc CoMMOimWvALTH 224, 225 (3d ed. 1908).
18. WILSON, Op. cit. supra note 16, at 260.
19. La Albra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899).
[Vol. 18
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set out to write a code of laws or procedure but, instead, sought
to construct "a frame of government.1
20
"To have prescribed the means by which the Government
should, in all future times, execute its powers, would have been
to change entirely the character of the instrument, and give it
the properties of a legal code." 2 1
If perfect harmony and identity of viewpoint as between the
Congress and the President were the invariable state of affairs in
Washington, the ambiguities of the veto provisions would oc-
casion neither concern nor comment. But our political history
volubly testifies that such a state of affairs is inconstant and
transient, and to insure that disagreement over the meaning
of these provisions does not at some future hour of national
crisis create an executive-legislative impasse in relation to criti-
cal legislation, the ambiguities in those provisions must be re-
moved. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Wright v. United
States,22 stressed that the certainty of the veto provisions appli-
cation "is of supreme importance.
'23
These uncertainties should not be permitted to persist pending
their resolution by the judiciary, nor is a clarifying constitutional
amendment either necessary or desirable. The former of these
alternatives offers at best a mere patchwork of interpretation,
and, more significantly, an impasse of the sort that ought to be
averted could very possibly be the first suitable future occasion
for invoking the judiciary's interpretative assistance.24 The latter
alternative, a constitutional amendment, involves travelling a
route along which the traffic is exceedingly slow, and the fatality
rate is exceedingly high.25 Moreover, the respected concept of
20. United States v. Weil (1894), 29 Ct. Cl. 523, 546 (1894).
21. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
22. 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
23. Id. at 599.
24. To date, the Supreme Court has rendered only five decisions in which it
has resolved controversies as to the meaning of certain of the veto provisions.
See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938) ; Edwards v. United States,
286 U.S. 482 (1932) ; Okanogan v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) ; Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); and La Albra Silver Mining
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899).
25. There have been several efforts made at amending the Constitution so as
specifically to authorize an item veto. The first attempt was initiated by
President Grant, who, in his message to the Forty-third Congress, recom-
mended an amendment "to authorize the Executive to approve of so much of
any measure passing the two Houses of Congress as his judgment may dictate,
without approving the whole, the disapproved portion or portions to be subject
to the same procedure as now." 7 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 242 (1898). Presidents Hayes and Arthur made similar
1966]
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the Constitution as a "frame of government" would be seriously
eroded by an amendment of sufficient detail and complexity to
eliminate all the existing uncertainties.
The solution lies in the adoption of legislation that will resolve
these ambiguities by filling in the details deliberately omitted
by those who drafted article I, section 7. It is beyond cavil that
Congress has the power to enact legislation which will clarify
and implement these constitutional provisions.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Con-
gress the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."2 6
Although these clauses were the source "of much virulent in-
vective and petulant declamation,'1 2 7 Hamilton observed that:
[I] t may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the consti-
tutional operation of this intended government would be pre-
cisely the same if these clauses were completely obliterated
[or] if they were repeated in every article. They are only
declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by neces-
sary and unavoidable implication from the very act of con-
stituting a Federal Government, and, vesting it with certain
specified powers.
28
There is no express grant of power which does not carry with
it others, not expressed but vital in its exercise, which may be
the subject of legislative action.29 The only constitutional limita-
tion upon the power thus expressly delegated to the Congress is
that the laws enacted in the exercise of the power shall be "neces-
sary and proper." Obviously, the power extends beyond the en-
actment of laws to carry into execution the legislative powers, and
comprehends such laws as are necessary and proper to the carry-
ing into effect of judicial and executive powers as well, for the
delegation specifically authorizes the enactment of laws to
effectuate all other powers vested by the Constitution in the
recommendations, but only as to appropriation bills. 7 RICHARDSON, op. cit.
supra at 528; 8 RicHARDsoN, op. cit. .mpra at 138. Similar proposals also have
originated in the Congress, the earliest having been made in 1876. H.R. Res. 46,
44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).
26. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
27. THE FEDERALiST, No. 33 at 211 (1 Dunne 1901) (Hamilton).
28. Id. at 4. The validity of this observation has never been seriously
doubted. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 137-38 (5th ed. 1891).
29. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 255 (1821).
[Vol. 18
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Government of the United States, or in any department or offi-
cer thereof. One entire title of the United States Code, Title 5,
pertains to the executive departments, officers and employees,
and another, Title 28, pertains to the judiciary and judicial pro-
cedure.30 The statutes continued in Titles 5 and 28 were adopted
by Congress. They effectuate the executive and judicial powers,
and are administered and enforced by the executive and judicial
departments; thus, they stand as monuments to the proposition
that it is the prerogative of the Congress to enact such legisla-
tion as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the
presidential veto power.
This congressional prerogative may not, of course, be employed
to enlarge or dilute the presidential power.31 But neither is its
exercise limited to what is absolutely necessary to the carrying
into effect of that power, and the Congress may, in its discretion,
adopt such legislation as it may deem desirable and appropriate
for that purpose, assuming of course the legislation is otherwise
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
32
III. UNCERTAINT tES OF MEANING: TmH NEED
FOR LEGIsLATIE IPLEMENTATION
The veto provisions, on a first reading, create an illusion of
clarity and incisiveness, attributes for which the Constitution as
a whole is renowned. In fact, the first paragraph of these pro-
visions is the second longest paragraph in the document, and the
second paragraph readily could have been incorporated in the
first at a considerable economy of language. When contrasted
with other, equally vital sections of the Constitution, article I,
section 7 is rather tumid. Yet despite, or perhaps because of, its
comparative prolixity, it contains ambiguities that have gener-
ated and will continue to generate uncertainty and confusion.
Attention herein will be addressed only to certain of the more
disquieting and unresolved ambiguities in the meaning of the
veto provisions.
33
30. The Supreme Court has even said that it is the dity of the Congress to
pass such laws as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers
vested in the judicial department. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 521 (1859).
31. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 381 (1907).
32. Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558 (1924).
33. Some of the more obvious ambiguities have been resolved by the Su-
preme Court. The problem of whether, when the provisions specify that a
veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each "House," a two-thirds
vote of the members of each House is required, or merely two-thirds of a
quorum, was unsettled and much debated until, in 1919, the Supreme Court
1966]
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A. The meaning of "presented to the President."
Article I, section 7 specifies no fewer than three times that
every bill shall be "presented to the President," and it provides
that if a bill thus presented is not returned by him "within ten
Days (Sundays excepted)," it shall be a law as if he had signed
it, "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Re-
turn." If, on the other hand, the President, within ten days after
the bill has been presented to him, returns it with his objections
to the House of its origin, the bill stands as vetoed and can be-
come law thereafter only if it is passed by a two-thirds vote of
each House.
The precise meaning of "presented" is first of all significant
because it marks the commencement of the ten-day constitutional
period. If a veto is timely, i.e., within ten days, the bill does not
become law; if, on the other hand, the bill is not returned within
that period of time, and the Congress remains in session, the
bill becomes law. But if the Congress should adjourn on the
tenth day without the bill having been returned, the question
arises whether such a bill becomes a law without the President's
approval or is to be considered the victim of a pocket veto. In
other words, does a congressional adjournment on the morning
of the tenth day deprive the President of most of the working
hours of that tenth day within which to decide if he should ap-
prove or veto the bill? This question is unresolved.
The traditional procedure by which bills are presented to the
President serves to gloss over some of the uncertainties in the
meaning of the term "presented." In practice, the original en-
rolled bill is delivered to a White House employee who issues a
dated receipt therefor and impresses a stamp on the bill bearing
the legend "The White House" and showing the date. The date
of the receipt, which coincides with the date stamped on the bill,
is in practice accepted as the first day of the ten-day consti-
tutional period. This, it bears repeating, is merely a matter of
practice and custom, neither dictated nor sanctioned by consti-
tutional provision, legislation or judicial decision.
held that the fractional requirement refers to a quorum of the membership.
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 248 U.S. 276 (1919). The question was
argued for almost 150 years before the Supreme Court decided that a President
may sign a bill after a congressional adjournment, notwithstanding a long-
established practice and custom to the contrary. Edwards v. United States, 286
U.S. 482 (1932). In Okanogan v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929), the
Supreme Court finally resolved in the affirmative the question of whether
there is such a thing as a "pocket veto."
[Vol. 18
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This practice originated early in our government's history and
before Presidents began frequently to absent themselves from
the continental limits of the United States during sessions of
Congress. In instances of the President's unavailability by reason
of his absence from the United States, if the Congress is domin-
ated by the political party of the President, a bill simply is not
"presented" until the President returns to Washington3 4 or, in
the alternative, the bill is flown to him abroad. Should the Con-
gress, or at least the House of origin, be dominated by the oppos-
ing political party, however, problems can arise. If a majority
of such a Congress or House of origin desire strongly that a bill
become law, whereas the absent President is known to oppose it,
the delivery of the bill in accordance with the standard custom
and practice to a White House employee could be contended as
marking the commencement of the ten-day period and the bill
deemed as having become law if the President's return should
be delayed beyond the ten days following such presentation. But
the President's partisans could take the position that, custom
and practice to the contrary notwithstanding, the bill had not
been "presented to the President" as required by article I, section
7 and did not become law.35 The Supreme Court's decision in
Edwards v. United States36 would appear to support the latter
position.
There is also the possibility that a President, on departing the
United States for an extended stay abroad during a session of an
uncooperative Congress, could instruct his White House staff not
to accept delivery of bills during his absence. Not only does the
34. Professor Corwin tells of an instance of this kind during the Seventy-
fourth Congress when a bill was delivered to and approved by the President
twenty-three days after the final adjournment of the Congress. CoawIN, THE
PRESIDENT, OFFICERS AND PoWERs 341, 503 (3d ed. 1948). This averted a
pocket veto as the bill was not signed until July 13, 1936, after the second
session of the Congress had adjourned sine die on June 20, 1936. See 49 Stat.
2041 (1936), 20 U.S.C. § 194 (1964).
35. In the first session of the Seventy-eighth Congress, while President
Roosevelt was abroad, a joint resolution was delivered to a White House
employee on November 18, 1943. [S.J. Res. 59, S. Joum., 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 493 (1943)]. In his veto message thereon, S. Doc. No. 135, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943), the President 'stated: "This joint resolution was pre-
sented to me on November 25, 1943". And during the same session, President
Roosevelt approved S. 630 (57 Stat. 595, Ch. 332) on December 3, 1943, noting
on the margin of the original enrolled bill "presented to me December 3, 1943,"
although the official Senate record states that the joint resolution was "pre-
sented to the President of the United States" on November 27, 1943, S. Joua.,
78th Cong., 1st Sess., 501 (1943).
36. 286 U.S. 482 (1932). See also Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583
(1938); Okanogan v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); La Alba Silver
Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899).
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Edwards decision appear to indicate that the described custom
and practice is not binding as to the constitutional meaning of
the term "presented", but to regard delivery to a White House
employee as satisfying the requirement that bills be "presented to
the President," would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in the so-called "Pocket Veto" case. 37 In that case
the Supreme Court held that there is "no substantial basis for
the suggestion that although the House in which the bill origi-
nated is not in session the bill may nevertheless be returned, con-
sistently with the constitutional mandate, by delivering it, with
the President's objections, to an officer or agent of the House, for
subsequent delivery to the House . ,*.s38 If return to a House
employee is not a "return to the House" within the meaning of
article I, section 7, by the same token a delivery to a presidential
employee would not satisfy the requirement that a bill be "pre-
sented to the President."
A further problem, and one of some gravity, arises when there
is a presidential succession either by reason of the election of a
new President or by reason of the death of the incumbent. The
President's term, since the adoption of the twentieth amendment,
expires seventeen days after the opening of the first session of a
new Congress. If a new Congress should present a bill to an out-
going President fewer than ten days before his term expires, may
the incoming, newly elected President approve or veto the bill
before the expiration of the ten days? Or, if a President should
die during a session of Congress, may his successor approve or
veto bills within ten days from the date on which they were
presented to his deceased predecessor?
The Supreme Court has indicated its belief that the incoming
President, to whom such a bill has not been presented, may not
act upon it. 3 0 President Truman, however, signed certain bills
that had been presented to President Roosevelt prior to the
latter's death,4 0 and while Mr. Truman's power to do so was not
37. Okanogan v. United States, supra note 36.
38. 279 U.S. at 683.
39. In Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 493 (1932), the Supreme
Court made the following prefatory remark:
But it does not follow that because an incoming President, to whom a
bill has not been presented by the Congress, cannot approve it . .. that
a continuing President, to whom a bill has been presented by the Con-
gress, must be debarred of his opportunity to give his approval within
the time which the Constitution has prescribed.
40. H.R. 2013, H.R. 510 and H.R. 685 were "presented" on April 12, 1945.
See H.R. JouR., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) at 258. President Roosevelt died
late that same afternoon and Mr. Truman took the oath of office as President
[V l. 18
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contested, the fact is the bills had not been "presented" to Presi-
dent Truman. This void, this lack of certainty as to what is
meant by "presented," 41 should be eliminated.
B. The Ordinary Veto
An "ordinary veto" refers to the President's exercise of his
option to return a bill of which he does not approve, along with
his objections, to the House where it originated, and serves to
distinguish this procedure from the so-called "pocket veto." Prob-
lems have already arisen with respect to the ordinary veto, and
others lurk in the constitutional language pertaining to it.
One such problem emerges when an attempt is made to deter-
mine precisely what actions taken by the Congress are subject
to the veto. This problem presently is quiescent, but it will not
always remain so and needs to be settled once and for all.
The first paragraph of article I, section 7 requires that "Every
Bill" passed by both Houses shall be presented to the President,
who may approve it or reject it. However, as will be more fully
discussed hereafter, the Constitution does not define a "Bill" and
the judiciary has not had occasion to clarify the meaning of the
term. It is fortuitous that no controversy has developed over
what is a bill and that, at the present time, any legislative instru-
ment entitled "A Bill" is regarded as subject to veto. This ab-
sence of definition may one day precipitate a stultifying dead-
lock between the President and the Congress.
The second paragraph of article I, section 7 was intended
merely to elaborate and buttress the first, but it requires that
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary"
shall be presented to the President for his approval or disap-
proval. This paragraph was added for the specific purpose of
preventing the Congress from circumventing the presidential
of the United States later that evening. The bills had been delivered at the
White House prior to President Roosevelt's death, while Mr. Truman was
Vice President. Thereafter, on April 16, President Truman approved H.R.
2013 [59 Stat. 52, ch. 61 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 412 (1954)], and on April 17 he
signed H.R. 510 [59 Stat. 52, ch. 62 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 413 (1954)] and H.R.
685 [59 Stat. 53, ch. 78 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 300 (1954)].
41. "Adjournment" is also a troublesome word in need of definition. The
decisions in the Okanogan ("Pocket Veto") and Wright cases, do not resolve
these questions: If a bill is passed by both Houses of a second session of a
Congress, which thereupon adjourns sine die, and the new Congress is convened
within ten days, may the President sign the bill into law? May he subject it to
an ordinary veto? If he does neither, is it the victim of his pocket veto? Or
does it become law without his signature?
1966]
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veto by taking action in the form of "Orders, Resolutions, or
Votes," 42 yet in current legislative practice the injunctions of
this paragraph largely are ignored. Joint resolutions are sub-
mitted to the President, but concurrent resolutions are not. As
long ago as the first session of the Fifty-eighth Congress, the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate stated that within his ex-
perience no concurrent resolution had ever been sent to the
President, and he added that "the Chair has endeavored faith-
fully to find out how concurrent resolutions escape the provi-
sions of the Constitution. He has not succeeded.1
43
This legislative practice of not referring concurrent resolutions
to the President for his approval or disapproval thus far has
gone unchallenged, 44 but in recent years it has come to be em-
ployed in a manner that can seriously impair the presidential
veto power and create an imbalance of power as between the
legislative and executive branches.
Since the early 1930's, many observers have descried the usurp-
ation of congressional functions by Presidents, but little has been
said regarding congressional encroachment on the presidential
veto power. 4r This encroachment is effected through the adop-
tion by the Congress of concurrent and other resolutions which,
apparently only because of long-standing practice, are not sub-
mitted to the President.
"Legislation" includes not only the enactment of statutes but
also bills to repeal them, and certainly bills intended to repeal
42. During the Constitutional Convention, when the first paragraph of article
1, section 7, was being debated, Madison pointed out that its provisions could
be by-passed if the Congress should take action in forms other than by "Bill."
His motion to insert the words "or Resolve" after "Bill" was rejected, but
Randolph succeeded in having the second paragraph added. 1 WATSON, CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 377, 378 (1910).
Expressly excluded from the requirement that "Orders, Resolutions or
Votes" be submitted to the President is congressional action as to adjourn-
ment, and in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 DalI. 378 (U.S. 1798) Justice Chase
said that "the negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation; he has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amend-
ments to the Constitution." Hollingsworth v. Virginia, supra at 381.
43. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 3483 (1907).
44. George B. Galloway, a respected observer and authority in this field, has
said that "a joint resolution is a bill" and for that reason must be approved
by the President. He distinguishes a concurrent resolution as being merely
expressive of "facts, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two houses" and
not, therefore, requiring presidential approval. "A simple resolution deals with
the affairs of one house only," and "an order embodies the commands and
requests of one house"; accordingly, neither is submitted to the President.
GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PRocEss 50, 51 (1953).
45. No "side" is taken in the debate whether either the presidential or con-
gressional power is too strong, vis-A-vis that of the other, by expression of
concern over the use of concurrent resolutions to by-pass the veto power.
[Vol. 18
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existing laws are required by the Constitution to be submitted
to the President for his approval or disapproval. But in the
last two decades the Congress has on several occasions employed
the resolution device for circumventing the presidential veto
power with respect to the repeal or termination of existing laws.
This is the very sort of tactic the second paragraph of article I,
section 7 was intended to checkmate.
The Lend-Lease Act authorized the President to extend "lend-
lease" aid, and then provided:
After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of a concurrent
resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which de-
clares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection
(a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the
United States neither the President nor the head of any de-
partment or agency shall exercise any of the powers con-
ferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until
July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the
extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with
such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or be-
fore the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever
is the earlier.
40
This represents a bold circumvention of a possible veto of re-
pealing legislation.
In the Reorganization Act of 194947 the President was author-
ized to promulgate reorganization plans shuffling functions and
powers within the executive department, but a reorganization
plan could be rejected by resolution adopted by either house
within sixty days after transmittal of the plan to it. If the basic
delegation of power to the President was valid, that delegation
should not have been subject to repeal, termination or negation by
a one- or two-house resolution.
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 195848 contained a
comparable use of the resolution technique for by-passing the
President. Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
19514 9 provided for presidential adjustment of tariffs and im-
position of quotas-either or both-to protect domestic industry
46. Act of Mar. 11, 1941, ch. 11 § 2, 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
47. 63 Stat. 203 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 133(2) (1964).
48. 72 Stat. 673 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1964).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1364 (a) (1964).
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from serious injury, upon findings and report of the Tariff Com-
mission. The 1958 law added a provision which reads in part:
(2) The action so found and reported by the Commission
to be necessary shall take effect ...
(A) if approved by the President, or
(B) if disapproved by the President in whole or in part,
upon the adoption by both Houses of the Congress (within
the 60-day period following the date on which the report
... is submitted to such committees), by the yeas and nays
by a two-thirds vote of each House, of a concurrent resolu-
tion stating in effect that the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives approve the action so found and reported by the
Commission to be necessary.
For the purpose of subparagraph (B), in the computation
of the 60-day period there shall be excluded the days on
which either House is not in session because of an adjourn-
ment of more than 3 days to a day certain or an adjournment
of the Congress sine die.
(3) In any case in which the contingency set forth in
paragraph (2) (B) occurs, the President shall (within 15
days after the adoption of such resolution) take such action
as may be necessary to make the adjustments, impose the
quotas, or make such other modifications, as were found and
reported by the Commission to be necessary.50
This represents legislation by the Congress of tariff policy in a
manner that circumvents the President's power to approve or
disapprove such legislation.
There are many other similar instances of congressional en-
croachment on the veto power.51 It is inevitable that "legislation"
of this character will one day be challenged, and such a chal-
lenge could very possibly lead to the invalidation of important
and critical legislation which, had it been enacted in the proper
form and submitted to the President as required, would have
been approved by the President and been impervious to attack.
This indicates a strong need for legislation to clarify and imple-
ment article I, section 7.
50. 72 Stat. 673 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (a) (1964).
51. This problem is the subject of an opinion given President Eisenhower
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Another problem,52 not dangerous but puzzling, involved in
the ordinary veto is the effect of the written memoranda with
which various Presidents have announced their approval of
legislation presented to them and in which they have expounded
their interpretations of such legislation. The Constitution re-
quires a President to return a bill of which he disapproves along
with a statement of his objections to it, but if he approves it
he is merely to "sign it." The President has no authority to
modify legislation. President Jackson, however, on sigming an
original enrolled bill in 1830, added "I approve this bill, and ask
a reference to my communication to Congress of this date, in
relation thereto." 53 In his referenced communication, he an-
nounced that he approved the bill with the understanding that a
road authorized to be constructed by it was not to be extended
beyond the boundaries of the Territory of Michigan.54 A select
committee of the House of Representatives later submitted a re-
port severely critical of President Jackson's action. They deemed
his course an objection to and negation of one section of the bill
and an approval of its other sections. 55
When President Truman approved the Hobbs Anti-Racketeer-
ing Act56 and the Portal-to-Portal Act,57 he sent messages to the
Congress in which he construed certain provisions of those mea-
sures. Arthur Krock declared that those messages constituted an
essential part to the legislative history of the acts to which the
courts would be obliged to refer if called upon to interpret
them.58 A contrary view was based on the reasoning that the
52. There are numerous other less serious problems, as, for instance, the
problem of the basis upon which a President may veto legislation. President
Washington, knowledgeable of the origins of the veto provisions, considered
that he could veto a bill only if he believed it unconstitutional. 33 WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (1940). President Jefferson held to the same
opinion. See 1 WATSON, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 373 (1910).
Willoughby, however, argued that the President does not have the authority
to veto a bill on the ground it is unconstitutional, as this would be a usurpa-
tion of the exclusive power of the judiciary. See 2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 658 (1929). President Taft disagreed
with this view, saying that as President he would have much less hesitation in
vetoing a bill for reasons of unconstitutionality than the Supreme Court should
have in declaring it unconstitutional. TAFT, THE PRESIDENCY 18 (1916). This
divergence of views could be resolved by congressional legislation not incon-
sistent, of course, with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
53. 4 Stat. 428, ch. CCXXXII (1830).
54. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 337 (1907).
55. H.R. REP. No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. (1830).
56. 60 Stat 420, ch. 537 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
57. 61 Stat 84, ch. 52 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 251 (1964).
58. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1947, p. 3.
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presidential message was not before Congress when it was con-
sidering the bills and therefore would shed no light on congres-
sional purpose in passing the bills.59 The latter view conforms
to what the select committee had said many years earlier regard-
ing Mr. Jackson's memorandum, namely, that it was merely "a
defacement of the public records and archives."6 0 This view
loses credence if it is remembered that the President, when acting
on bills passed by both Houses of the Congress, is a part of the
legislative process and acting in a legislative capacity, which
leads to the conclusion that the intent of the Senate and the
House of Representatives should not be considered apart from
the intent of the President.6 1
It cannot be predicted whether the judiciary would subscribe
to Mr. Krock's reasoning or to the opposing view. Legislation
to clarify the presidential veto power could resolve this problem.
(. The Separate Veto of Non-germane Riders
If a rider concerning one subject has been attached to a piece
of legislation dealing with an entirely different subject, must
the President approve or reject this omnibus instrument in its
entirety, or may he veto the rider and approve the balance? This
is yet another problem that surfaces when one attempts to apply
the veto provisions of the Constitution to concrete factual situ-
ations, and it urgently needs to be settled.62
As America's world responsibilities enlarge and the enactment
by Congress of legislation having international impact becomes
the more common, the seriousness of this particular problem in-
tensifies. The Foreign Aid Bill of 1964, for example, was jeopar-
dized for a time by efforts to encumber it with riders dealing
with the reapportionment of state legislatures. In that instance,
but for the close, compatible working relationship between Presi-
dent Johnson and the majority of the Eighty-ninth Congress, a
59. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICERS AND POWERS, 344 (3d ed. 1948).
60. H.R. REP. No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. (1830).
61. Cf. Shelton Hotel Co. v. Pates, 104 P.2d 478, 481 (Wash. 1940).
62. The separate veto of non-germane riders is not to be confused with its
kin, the "item veto," the latter being a power expressly given by state constitu-
tions to most governors with respect to appropriation bills. At the federal
level, the President in fact may not need to be endowed with the power to
veto specific items in appropriation bills, as he has another remedy, namely,
not to spend the money appropriated in items objectionable to him. See Item
Veto, Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 47, Before the Subcommittee No. 3 of the
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disagreement between the two branches as to whether the veto
is applicable separately to non-germane riders could have erupted
into an executive-legislative stalemate of considerable gravity.
0 3
It is manifest that our involvements abroad, and in Viet Nam
particularly, will require the Ninetieth Congress to enact legis-
lation of great national and international significance. It is
manifest also that the relationship between the President and
the Ninetieth Congress may be less congenial than was the re-
lationship between Mr. Johnson and the Eighty-ninth, and it is
within the realm of reason to conjecture that coalitions of anti-
administration members of the Ninetieth Congress may seek to
use legislative measures strongly desired by the President as
vehicles for non-germane riders strongly opposed by him. If, let
us suppose, a coalition of dissidents in the Ninetieth Congress
should succeed in attaching to a defense appropriation bill a
rider calling for the repeal of existing civil-rights legislation, the
problem whether the President would have the power to veto
the non-germane rider and approve the balance of the legislation
could become so acute as to bring the legislative process to a
standstill.
This problem stems from the ambiguity of the dictum in
article I, section ' that "every Bill . . . shall . . . be presented
to the President... ; If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it . . . . 64 The long-unchallenged view has been
that this proviso affords the President with but two alternatives:
either to approve the "Bill" or to return it. But this view rests
on the assumed premise that any legislative instrument passed by
the Congress is a "Bill" if so entitled-whether it treats of one
subject or of many, unrelated subjects. This assumption is, at
best, a tenuous one, and such validity as can be ascribed to it
must derive from the notion that a baseless assumption achieves
a degree of invulnerability with age and repetition. But no de-
63. On November 13, 1966, following the adjournment of the 89th Congress,
the President approved H.R. 13103 (Public Law 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539
[1966]), which had been labelled the "Christmas Tree Bill" by the various
news media. This apt appellation was inspired by the nongermane riders at-
tached to a bill originally introduced for the single purpose of amending certain
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 pertaining to income derived
from United States sources by foreign investors. The bill in its original form
had been introduced at the President's request, and he approved the bodge-
podge legislative instrument ultimately submitted to him only because he
found the non-germane riders unobjectionable. (Indeed, one of the riders,
having to do with contributions to political parties, had been recommended by
him.)
64. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
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ference is required to be given the fact that the rote of practice,
custom and belief has it that the President is without the power
to veto non-germane riders, for in Edwards v. United States"
the Supreme Court held that the President has the power to sign
bills subsequent to the adjournment of the Congress, long-estab-
lished practice, custom and belief to the contrary notwith-
standing.
The Constitution itself does not define the word "Bill" and
imposes no limitations upon the contents of a bill. Further, the
Constitutional Convention debates and The Federalist papers are
barren of any discussion of the subject. There is no evidence that
the invention of non-germane riders and omnibus bills was fore-
seen at the time the Constitution was being written and debated.
66
The judiciary never has delineated the meaning of the term
"Bill". Accordingly, there is nothing, save for an insupportable
but hoary assumption, to bar fresh consideration of what is a
"Bill" within the purview of article I, section 7.
Bearing in mind that "it is a Constitution we are construing," 67
there is persuasive support for the view that a bill, within the
letter and intent of the Constitution, is a legislative instrument
setting forth one or more propositions of law all related to a
single subject matter. Quite apart from substantive consider-
ations, this concept of a bill more strongly appeals to logic and
common sense than does the concept which requires merely that
there be a single instrument but permits that instrument to em-
brace any number of unrelated and unconnected subject matters.
The mere fact that a legislative measure is entitled "A Bill"
doesn't make it so within the purview of the Constitution. Jus-
tice Stone observed that the Constitution "is concerned with sub-
stance and not with form,"68 and this principle permeates federal
law.
0 9
65. 286 U.S. 482 (1932).
66. The delegates to the Convention, and the authors of The Federalist,
were preoccupied with the more basic issues respecting the veto power, viz,
whether the power should be absolute or limited, whether it should be reposed
in the President alone, and what proportion of Congress should be required to
override a veto.
67. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). (Empha-
sis not supplied.)
68. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490 (1935).
69. The principle is commonly applied in Federal tax cases [see, e.g., Simp-
son v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 (1964); Commissioner v. Hansen, 360
U.S. 446, 461 (1959); Bagley v. Commissioneer, 331 U.S. 737, 739, 744
(1947); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945)]; in
criminal prosecutions (see, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 607
(1953) ; Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other
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More importantly, an analysis of the nature and purpose of
the President's veto power points to the conclusion that a single
subject, rather than a single instrument, is the true hallmark of a
"Bill." For if that word encompasses any single instrument of
legislation, the preservation or destruction of the veto power rests
entirely within the domain of congressional discretion. The
President's veto power is preserved intact only if bills are limited
to one subject; it is destroyed completely if a session of Congress
incorporates all of its legislative program in a single instrument.
In eve y instance where a legislative document embracing con-
gressional treatment of more than one subject is submitted to
the President, his veto power is frustrated if he agrees with the
congressional treatment of one such subject and disagrees with
its treatment of another subject, but is required to approve
or reject the document in its entirety. To concede that, at its
discretion, Congress thus may preserve or destroy the veto power
by varying the number and variety of the subjects it includes for
treatment in a bill, is to concede to Congress the authority to
negate a power expressly awarded to the President by the Con-
stitution. The fallacy of the view that the President may not
veto non-germane riders thus is laid bare.
Further, the rules of both the House of Representatives 70 and
the Senate' 1 provide that matters not germane to a bill are sub-
ject to a point of order. Ordinarily, and in general practice, the
Congress enacts separate bills respecting separate subjects, doing
so in consistence with the concept given expression in its rules
that a bill is a measure addressed to a single subject. If, however,
a point of order is not successfully maintained respecting non-
germane riders, the President ultimately is faced with a bill
containing extraneous matter that may be objectionable to him.
Something more is needed, therefore, than legislative rules of
procedure if the veto power is to be preserved, and a statutory
definition of the term "Bill" would restore to the President the
veto power which the founding fathers contemplated and of
which he is deprived by the practice of incorporating extraneous
and distasteful provisions in a bill which is otherwise necessary
and desirable. The President should have the same right as the
grounds, 364 U.S. 631 (1961)] ; and other cases [see, e.g., Stoehr v. Wallace,
255 U.S. 239, 251 (1921) ; Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G. v. McGrath, 196
F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Kaname Fugino v. Clark, 172 F.2d 384, 385 (9th
Cir. 1949) ; Favini v. Van Dyke, 111 F.2d 981, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1940)].
70. H.R. Res. 46, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., R. 16 No. 7 (1876).
71. S. Res. 18, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., R. 16 (1884).
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members of the Congress to object to matters which are not
germane to a bill. And if, by its legislative action in incorpor-
ating several subject matters in one instrument designated "A
Bill", the Congress may defeat or curtail the constitutional veto
power, surely by legislative action defining the term it may pre-
serve that power.
IV. CONCLUSIO.W
The presidential veto is unlike its historical predecessors, being
a qualified rather than an absolute negative. It is unique in that,
in a government of separated powers, the veto provisions con-
stitute the Chief Executive a part of the Legislature and make
the veto an instrument for effectuating the system of checks and
balances. Manifestly, the veto power is a vital component in the
machinery of the federal government.
The Congress should exercise its authority to enact legislation
which will extirpate the ambiguities from the provisions of
article I, section 7. Without such legislation, the meaning and
application of those provisions will continue to be matters of
uncertainty. Such uncertainties inevitably foster conflicting in-
terpretations that can lead to a disastrous breakdown of the
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